




It is assumed that players bundle nodes in which other players must move into analogy
classes, and players only have expectations about the average behavior in every class. A
solution concept is proposed for multi-stage games with perfect information: at every
node players choose best-responses to their analogy-based expectations, and expectations
are correct on average over those various nodes pooled together into the same analogy
classes. The approach is applied to a variety of games. It is shown that a player may
bene￿t from having a coarse analogy partitioning. And for simple analogy partitioning,
(1) initial cooperation followed by an end opportunistic behavior may emerge in the
￿nitely repeated prisoner￿s dilemma (or in the centipede game), (2) an agreement need
not be reached immediately in bargaining games with complete information.
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11 Introduction
Received game theory assumes that players are perfectly rational both in their ability to form
correct expectations about other players￿ behavior and in their ability to select best-responses
to their expectations.
The game of chess is a striking example in which the standard approach is inappropriate.
In chess, it is clearly impossible to know (learn) what the opponent might do for every board
position.
In this paper, we investigate situations in which players form their expectations about
others￿ behavior by analogy between several contingencies as opposed to for every single
contingency in which each of these other players must move.1 More precisely, each player i
bundles nodes at which players other than i must move - a bundle is called an analogy class.
And player i only forms expectations about the average behavior in each analogy class that
he considers.
In other words, player i is viewed here as simplifying what he wants to know (learn) about
others￿ behavior:2 Player i categorizes nodes in which other players must move into analogy
classes. And only the average behavior in each analogy class is being considered by player i.
We use the word ￿analogy￿ because in two nodes belonging to a same class, the expectation
formed by the player is the same. Besides, the equilibrium expectation in an analogy class will
be assumed to coincide with the eﬀective average behavior in the class. Accordingly, nodes
which are visited more often will contribute more to the expectation, and the behaviors in
those nodes will contaminate the expectation used in all nodes of the analogy class (no matter
how often they are visited). The extrapolation (here of the expectation) from more visited
to less visited contingencies is - we believe - a key feature of the analogy idea.3
The aim of this paper is twofold. The ￿rst objective is to propose a solution concept to
describe the interaction of players forming their expectations by analogy. This will be called
the analogy-based expectation equilibrium. The second objective is to analyze the properties
of analogy-based expectation equilibria in various strategic interaction contexts.
The games we consider are multi-stage games with almost perfect information and perfect
recall. That is, simultaneous moves and moves by Nature are allowed. But, in any stage, all
previous moves are assumed to be known to every player.4
1This approach seems particularly appropriate in situations with many contingencies (like chess) so that
learning behavior for every possible contingency seems too hard (impossible).
2This makes learning easier and successful learning more plausible.
3It should be noted that what is considered here is the idea of forming expectations by analogy as opposed
to acting by analogy (see discussion section).
4Extensions to incomplete information setups raise no conceptual diﬃculties, but make the exposition
2The partitioning into analogy classes used by the players is given exogenously.5 It is
viewed as part of the description of the strategic environment. An analogy class αi of player
i is a set of pairs (j,h) such that player j, j 6= i,m u s tm o v ea tn o d eh.W er e q u i r et h a ti f
two elements (j,h)a n d( j0,h 0) belong to the same analogy class, the action spaces of player
j at node h a n do fp l a y e rj0 at node h0 are identically labelled.6
Player i￿s analogy-based expectation βi is player i￿s expectation about the average behavior
of other players in every analogy class αi considered by player i - we will denote by βi(αi)
the expectation in the analogy class αi.A n analogy-based expectation equilibrium is a pair
(σ,β)w h e r eσ is a strategy pro￿le and β is an analogy-based expectation pro￿le such that
two conditions are satis￿ed. First, for each player i and for each node at which player i
must move, player i￿s strategy σi is a best-response to his analogy-based expectation βi.7
Second, for each player i and analogy class αi,p l a y e ri￿s expectation βi(αi)i sconsistent with
the average behavior in class αi as induced by the strategy pro￿le σ (where the behavior
of player j in node h ,( j,h) ∈ αi, is weighted by the frequency with which (j,h) is visited
according to σ - relative to other elements in αi).8
Clearly, if all players use the ￿nest partitioning as their analogy devices, the strategy
pro￿le of an analogy-based expectation equilibrium coincides with a Subgame Perfect Nash
equilibrium. However, when at least one player does not use the ￿nest partitioning, the play
of an analogy-based expectation equilibrium will in general diﬀer from that of a Subgame
Perfect Nash equilibrium (or even from that of a Nash equilibrium). We also note that in
￿nite environments an analogy-based expectation equilibrium always exists.
In the second part of the paper, we investigate a few properties of analogy-based expec-
tation equilibria in a variety of games. We ￿rst observe that sometimes a player may bene￿t
from having a coarse analogy partitioning as compared with the ￿nest partitioning.
notationally heavy.
5One might think of the partitioning as resulting from the past experiences of the players and also from the
way the strategic interaction is framed to the players thus triggering some connections with past experiences
(the so called framing eﬀect, see Tversky-Khaneman 1981).
6Strictly speaking, it is enough to require that there is a bijection between the two action spaces. Note
also that our formalism allows for analogies accross diﬀerent players.
7More precisely, player i￿s strategy σi is a best-response (after every node where player i must move) to
the behavioral strategy that assigns player j t op l a ya c c o r d i n gt ot h ee x p e c t a t i o nβi(αi)a tn o d eh,f o re v e r y
(j,h) in the analogy class αi and for every analogy class αi.
8We think of the consistency requirement as resulting from a learning process in which players would
eventually manage to have correct analogy-based expectations (and not as resulting from introspection or
calculations on the part of the players). And if no node h such that (j,h) belongs to αi is ever visited
according to σ, (strong) consistency is de￿n e dw i t hr e s p e c tt oas m a l lp e r t u r b a t i o no fσ. (This is in spirit of
the de￿nition of sequential equilibrium.)
3Clearly, this is not so if this player plays against Nature or if other players have a dominant
strategy. Then a coarse partitioning has the sole eﬀect of making this player ￿s choice of
strategy possibly suboptimal without aﬀecting the behaviors of others. But, otherwise, a
coarse partitioning of, say, player i may well induce (in equilibrium) a change of strategies of
players other than i (as a response to a change of strategy of player i). When such a change
of strategies is good for player i,p l a y e ri may in equilibrium end up with a strictly higher
payoﬀ.
We next apply the analogy-based expectation approach to the so called ￿nite horizon
paradoxes. For simple analogy partitioning, we show both in the centipede game and in
the ￿nitely repeated prisoner￿s dilemma that there may be equilibria in which there is a fair
amount of cooperation throughout the game except possibly toward reaching the end of the
game at which time some opportunistic behavior may occur.
To illustrate the claim, consider a variant of the ￿nitely repeated prisoner￿s dilemma in
which there are many periods, there is no discounting and the exact values of the stage game
prisoner￿s dilemma payoﬀs are independently drawn from period to period according to some
pre-speci￿ed distribution (with ￿nite support). And assume that both players categorize
histories into two analogy classes according to whether or not some opportunistic behavior
was previously observed (within the game).
Playing cooperatively most of the time except if some opportunistic behavior previously
occurred or toward the end of the game (if the immediate gain from switching to an oppor-
tunistic behavior is suﬃciently high) is part of an analogy-based expectation equilibrium.
To see this, consider the expectations induced by the behaviors just described. Each
player should expect the other player (1) to play opportunistically whenever some oppor-
tunistic behavior previously occurred and (2) to play cooperatively (on average) with a large
probability otherwise (if the number of repetitions is large). Given such expectations, play-
ing opportunistically is optimal whenever some opportunistic behavior previously occurred.
And, when no opportunistic behavior previously occurred, playing cooperatively in all but a
few periods toward the end is also optimal because players perceive that by playing oppor-
tunistically they will trigger a non-cooperative phase whereas by playing cooperatively they
expect the other player to continue playing cooperatively with a large probability.
The key reason why the logic of backward induction fails here is that players do not
perceive exactly when the other player will start having an opportunistic behavior. As a
result of this fuzzy perception (which is due to their analogy partitioning), players play
cooperatively most of the time because on average it is true that by playing cooperatively
the other player keeps playing cooperatively with a large probability.
4It should be noted that players do consider playing opportunistically toward reaching
the end of the game, even if no opportunistic behavior previously occurred. This is so
whenever the immediate gain from playing opportunistically oﬀsets the cost of triggering a
n o n - c o o p e r a t i v ep h a s et i l lt h ee n do ft h eg a m e( a so p p o s e dt om a i n t a i n i n gt h ec o o p e r a t i v e
phase). In this sense, players do perceive the time structure of the interaction even though
they do not perceive the exact time structure of the strategy employed by their opponent.9
We also brie￿yc o n s i d e rt h ei n ￿nitely repeated prisoner￿s dilemma. We observe that
strategy pro￿les in which some deviations are not punished can be sustained with the analogy-
based expectation approach. The point is that, while such a deviation would be pro￿table,
it need not perceived as such if the corresponding node is bundled with nodes in which there
w o u l db ea ne ﬀective punishment. As a result (of such an analogy partitioning), the involved
player perceives an average punishment, which deters him from deviating. Thus, in repeated
games, the analogy-based approach permits less systematic punishments than the standard
approach does.
Our next application deals with ultimatum and bargaining games. Suppose that players
c a nm a k ea n yp o s s i b l eo ﬀer, but that they have expectations about the acceptance probability
only according to whether the oﬀer is above or below a threshold (i.e., whether or not their
oﬀer is generous). We show that (1) the responder in a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer game may
get a payoﬀ that lies strictly above his reservation utility (i.e. his payoﬀ from refusing any
agreement), (2) there may be no immediate agreement in a (complete information) bargaining
game in which players alternate making oﬀers.
The eﬀect of analogy reasoning here is to reduce the set of oﬀers that players consider in
equilibrium. If a player makes a generous oﬀer, he will always consider the least generous oﬀers
among these. This is because (due to his analogy partitioning) he has the same (acceptance)
expectation for all such oﬀers, and the least generous oﬀer among these is clearly the one
he likes best given such an expectation. The analysis of ultimatum and bargaining games
follows.
In the last part of the paper, we provide some general discussion. We ￿rst diﬀerentiate the
analogy-based expectation equilibrium from other solution concepts, in particular related to
the idea of imperfect recall (and of imperfect information).10 Second, we suggest two princi-
ples that may help structure analogy partitioning. The ￿rst principle applies to those games
in which all players must move in the same nodes, and we consider the extra requirement
that a player should himself behave in the same way in all nodes associated with the same
9The analogy approach thus permits an endogenous treatment of the end eﬀect identi￿ed in experiments
(see Selten-Stocker 1986).
10An alternative interpretation for the concept is also proposed and discussed.
5analogy class. The second principle is that all analogy classes considered by every player
should be reached with positive probability along the played path. For both principles, we
provide examples in which the prediction of the analogy-based approach is in sharp contrast
with the conventional approach. We also analyze the issue of multiplicity of equilibria, and
we discuss some of the related literature on bounded rationality.
2 A general framework
2.1 The class of games
We consider multi-stage games with almost perfect information and perfect recall. That is, in
each stage every player knows all the actions that were taken at any previous stage (including
those exogenous events determined by Nature at any previous stage), and no information set
contained in the current stage provides any knowledge of play in that stage.11
In the main part of the paper, we will restrict attention to games with a ￿nite number
of stages such that, at every stage and for every player (including Nature), the set of pure
actions is ￿nite. This class of (￿nite) multi-stage games with almost perfect information is
referred to as Γ.12
T h es t a n d a r dr e p r e s e n t a t i o no fa ne x t e n s i v ef o r mg a m ei nc l a s sΓ includes the set of
players i =1 ,...n denoted by N,t h eg a m et r e eΥ (specifying who moves when and over
which space, including the exogenous events chosen by Nature), and the preferences %i of
every player i over outcomes in the game.
An o d ei nt h eg a m et r e eΥ will be denoted by h; it contains information about all the
actions, including those by Nature, that were taken at any stage prior to node h.T h es e to f
nodes h will be denoted by H.T h es e to fn o d e sa tw h i c hp l a y e ri must move will be denoted
by Hi.F o re v e r yn o d eh ∈ Hi,w el e tAi(h) denote player i￿s action space at node h.
Remark: When interpreting experiments, it may be meaningful to view the players as
being engaged in a variety of games as opposed to only one game.13 One can represent this
as a metagame made of an extra move by Nature in stage 0 which would determine the
eﬀective game to be played (according to the frequency with which each (original) game was
played).
11Also, simultaneous moves are allowed, but each player moves at most once within a given stage.
12In some applications, we will consider in￿nite action spaces and/or in￿nitely many stages. The solution
concept will easily generalize to these applications.
13For example, bargaining and ultimatum games or centipede games of various lengths...
6Classes of analogy:
Each player i forms an expectation about the behavior of other players j, j 6= i.H o w e v e r ,
player i does not form an expectation about every player j￿s behavior in every contingency
h ∈ Hj in which player j must move. He pools together several contingencies in which other
players must move, and he forms an expectation about the average behavior in these pooled
contingencies. Such a pool is referred to as a class of analogy.
Formally, each player i partitions the set {(j,h) ∈ N ￿ Hj,j6= i} into subsets αi referred
to as analogy classes.14 The collection of player i￿s analogy classes αi is referred to as player
i￿s analogy partition, and it is denoted by Ani.W h e n ( j,h)a n d( j0,h 0) are in the same
analogy class αi,w er e q u i r et h a tAj(h)=Aj0(h0). That is, in two contingencies (j,h)a n d
(j0,h 0)t h a tp l a y e ri treats by analogy, the action space of the involved player(s) should be
the same.15 The common action space in the analogy class αi will be denoted by A(αi). The
pro￿le of analogy partitions (Ani)i∈N will be denoted by An.
Remark: At ￿rst glance, there is some resemblance between an analogy class and an
information set in an extensive form game with incomplete information. However, note that
Ani refers to a partitioning of the nodes where players other than i must move (as opposed
to a partitioning of the nodes where player i himself must move as in the notion of player i￿s
information set).16
Strategic environment:
A strategic environment in our setup not only speci￿es the set of players N,t h eg a m e
tree Υ and players￿ preferences %i.I ta l s os p e c i ￿es how the various players partition the set
of nodes at which other players must move into classes of analogy, which is summarized in
An. A strategic environment is thus formally given by (N,Υ,%i,An).
2.2 Concepts
Analogy-based expectations:
An analogy-based expectation for player i is denoted by βi.I ts p e c i ￿es for every player i￿s
analogy class αi, a probability measure over the action space A(αi). This probability measure
is denoted by βi(αi), and βi(αi) should be interpreted as player i￿s expectation about the
14A partition of a set X is a collection of subsets xk ⊆ X such that
S
k
xk = X and xk ∩ xk0 = ∅ for k 6= k
0.
15More generally, we could allow the players to relabel the original actions of the various players as they
wish. From that prespective, Aj(h) should only be required to be in bijection with Aj0(h
0)( a so p p o s e dt o
being equal). Describing this and the subsequent notion of consistency would require heavy notations without
adding anything to the concept. It is therefore ignored for expositional reasons.
16We will oﬀer more discussion throughout the paper on the relationship between analogy reasoning and
incomplete information (and imperfect recall) in extensive form games.
7average behavior in class αi.
Remark: Note again the diﬀerent nature of βi(•)a n do fp l a y e ri￿s belief system in extensive
form games with incomplete information. Here βi(αi) is an expectation (or belief) about the
average behavior of players other than i in class αi. (It is not a belief, say, about the likelihood
of the various elements (j,h)p o o l e di nαi.)
Strategy:
A behavior strategy for player i is a mapping that assigns to each node h ∈ Hi at which
player i must move a distribution over player i￿s action space at that node.17
Formally, a behavior strategy for player i is denoted by σi.I ts p e c i ￿es for every h ∈ Hi a
distribution - denoted σi(h) ∈ ∆Ai(h)-a c c o r d i n gt ow h i c hp l a y e ri selects actions in Ai(h)
when at node h.W ea l s ol e tσ−i denote the strategy pro￿le of players other than i, and we
let σ denote the strategy pro￿le of all players.
Sequential rationality:
The criterion used by the players to choose their strategies given their analogy-based
expectations is as follows. Given his analogy-based expectation βi,p l a y e ri constructs a
strategy pro￿le for players other than i that assigns player j to play according to βi(αi)a t
node h whenever (j,h) ∈ αi. (This is the most natural strategy pro￿le compatible with player
i￿s partial expectation βi.18) And the criterion considered by player i is that of best-response
against this induced strategy pro￿le after every node where player i must move.
Formally, for every βi and j 6= i,w ed e ￿ne the βi-perceived strategy of player j, σ
βi
j ,a s 19
σ
βi
j (h)=βi(αi) whenever (j,h) ∈ αi.
Given player i￿s strategy σi and given node h,w el e tσi |h denote the continuation strategy
of player i induced by σi from node h onwards. Similarly, we let σ−i |h and σ |h be the strategy
pro￿les induced by σ−i and σ, respectively, from node h onwards. We also let uh
i (σi |h,σ−i |h)
denote the expected payoﬀ obtained by player i when the play has reached node h, and players
behave according to the strategy pro￿le σ.20
17Mixed strategies and behavior strategies are equivalent since we consider games of perfect recall. The
behavior strategy formulation is better suited to de￿ne the consistency condition (see below).
18If for every h such that (j,h) ∈ αi, the behavior strategy of player j at node h is given by βi(αi), then
the average of these (whatever the weighting of the various elements of αi)m u s tb eβi(αi). A richer setup
would allow player i to consider any strategy pro￿le for players other than i that is compatible with his partial
knowledge βi (see Remark 2 after the de￿nition of analogy-based expectation equilibria).
19This de￿nes a strategy for player j because all (j,h)w h e r eh ∈ Hj belong to one and only one αi since
the set of αi is a partition of {(j,h) ∈ N ￿ Hj,j6= i}.
20These functions can formally be derived from %i and the distributions over outcomes induced by σ |h.
8Deﬁnition 1 (Criterion) Player i￿s strategy σi is a sequential best-response to the analogy-
based expectation βi if and only if for all strategies σ0










In equilibrium, we require the analogy-based expectations of the players to be consistent.
That is, to correspond to the real average behavior in every considered class where the
weight given to the various elements of an analogy class must itself be consistent with the
real probabilities of visits of these various elements.
We think of the consistency requirement as resulting from a learning process in which
players would eventually manage to have correct analogy-based expectations. In line with
the literature on learning in games (see Fudenberg-Levine 1998), we distinguish according
to whether or not consistency is also required for analogy classes that are reached with
probability 0 in equilibrium.21
To present formally the consistency idea, we denote by Pσ(h) the probability that node
h is reached according to the strategy pro￿le σ.
Deﬁnition 2 (Weak Consistency) Player i￿s analogy based expectation βi is consistent with
















whenever Pσ(h) > 0 for some h and j such that (j,h) ∈ αi.
This de￿nition deserves a few comments. The view is that each player i happens to make
consistent (or correct) analogy-based expectations as a result of learning.S u p p o s e p l a y e r s
repeatedly act in the environment as described above. Suppose further that the true pattern
of behavior adopted by the players is that described by the strategy pro￿le σ. Consider player
i who tries to forecast the average behavior in the analogy class αi, assumed to be reached
with positive probability (according to σ).
The actual behavior in the analogy class αi is an average of what every player j actually
does in each of the nodes h where (j,h) ∈ αi,t h a ti s ,σj(h). The correct weighting of σj(h)
should coincide with the frequency with which node (j,h) is visited (according to σ)r e l a t i v et o
21When it is required for unreached classes, the underlying learning model should involve some form of
trembling (or exogenous experimentation). When it is not, trembles are not necessary.







which in turn yields expression (1).
It should be noted that De￿n i t i o n2p l a c e sn or e s t r i c t i o n so np l a y e ri￿s expectations about
those analogy classes that are not reached according to σ. The next de￿nition proposes a
stronger notion of consistency (in the spirit of trembling hand or sequential equilibrium) that
places restrictions also on those expectations.
Formally, we de￿ne Σ0 to be the set of totally mixed strategy pro￿les, i.e. strategy pro￿les
σ such that for every player j, for every node h ∈ Hj at which player j must move, any action
aj in the action space Aj(h) is played with strictly positive probability (thus implying that
σj(h) has full support on Aj(h) for all j, h ∈ Hj).
For every strategy pro￿le σ ∈ Σ0, all analogy classes are reached with positive probability.
Thus, there is a unique analogy-based expectation βi that is consistent with σ in the sense
of satisfying condition (1) for all analogy classes αi. Denote this analogy-based expectation
by βi hσi.
Deﬁnition 3 (Strong consistency) Player i￿s analogy-based expectation βi is strongly consis-









k=1 converges to βi.
Solution concepts:
In equilibrium, we require that at every node players play best-responses to their analogy-
based expectations (sequential rationality) and that expectations are consistent. We de￿ne
two solution concepts according to whether or not consistency is imposed for analogy classes
that are not reached along the played path. And we refer to a pair (σ,β)o fs t r a t e g yp r o ￿le
and analogy-based expectation pro￿le as an assessment.
Deﬁnition 4 An assessment (σ,β) is a Self-Con￿rming Analogy-Based Expectation Equilib-
rium if and only if for every player i ∈ N,
1. σi is a sequential best-response to βi and
2. βi is consistent with σ.
Deﬁnition 5 An assessment (σ,β) is an Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibrium if and only
if for every player i ∈ N,
1. σi is a sequential best-response to βi and
2. βi is strongly consistent with σ.
10Remark 1: To the extent that the number of analogy classes αi considered by player
i is small, player i has few features of the other players￿ behavior to learn, which makes
the consistency requirement more plausible from a learning perspective than in the perfect
rationality paradigm.
Remark 2: A priori there are strategies other than σ
βi
−i that could generate the analogy-
based expectation βi.22 Am o r ee l a b o r a t ec r i t e r i o nt h a nt h eo n ec o n s i d e r e di nD e ￿nition 1
would view player i as playing a best-response against some strategy pro￿le σ0
−i compatible
with βi but not necessarily σ
βi
−i. The corresponding solution concepts would be somewhat
more complicated to present (but most of the insights developed below would continue to
hold for such alternative speci￿cations).
Remark 3: We have assumed that player i￿s analogy classes are partitions of the nodes
where players other than i must move. In some cases, it may be meaningful to allow players to
predict the behavior of other players also based on their own behavior. There is no diﬃculty
with allowing the analogy classes αi to also include nodes (i,h)s u c ht h a ta tn o d eh player i
must choose an action in A(αi) (the same action space as the one faced by the other players
involved in αi). However, it should be understood that the corresponding analogy-based
expectation βi(αi)i su s e db yp l a y e ri only to construct a strategy pro￿le for players other
than i (see De￿nition 1).23
Remark 4: The setup could easily be extended to cover the case where players have private
information. However, this would signi￿cantly complicate the description of the setup. For
expositional (rather than conceptual) reasons, we have chosen to focus on games with almost
perfect information.
2.3 Preliminary results
We conclude this general presentation by making two simple observations. The ￿rst one
shows the relation to subgame perfection when all players use the ￿nest partitioning as their
analogy device. The second one shows the existence of analogy-based expectation equilibria
in ￿nite environments.
Formally, we say that all players use the ￿nest analogy partitioning if there are no i, (j,h),
(j0,h 0) 6=( j,h)a n dαi ∈ Ani such that (j,h) ∈ αi and (j0,h 0) ∈ αi.W eh a v e :
Proposition 1 Consider an environment (N,Υ,%i,An) in which all players use the ￿nest
22In general (except for σ
βi
−i), to check that σ
0
−i generates βi it is indispensable to know the frequency of
visits of every node h ∈ αi (as given by the candidate strategy pro￿le σ).
23We have chosen not to present the concept with that extension because it could create an extra source of
confusion (with the notion of information set).
11analogy partitioning. Then if (σ,β) is an analogy-based expectation equilibrium of (N,Υ,%i
,An), σ i saS u b g a m eP e r f e c tN a s hE q u i l i b r i u mo f(N,Υ,%i).
Proof. When players use the ￿nest analogy partitioning, strong consistency of β with respect
to σ implies that σ
βi
−i = σ−i. Proposition 1 then follows from De￿nition 1.
Remark: When at least one player, say player i,d o e sn o tu s et h e￿nest partition as his
analogy device, the play of an analogy-based expectation equilibrium need not correspond to
that of a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium. This is because in an analogy-based expectation
equilibrium (σ,β), player i￿s strategy σi is required to be a best-response to σ
βi
−i (after every
node h). But, σ
βi
−i need not (in general) coincide with σ−i as in a Subgame Perfect Nash
equilibrium. This will be further illustrated throughout the paper.
Proposition 2 (Existence) Every ￿nite environment (N,Υ,%i,An) has at least one analogy-
based expectation equilibrium.
Proof. T h es t r a t e g yo fp r o o fi st h es a m ea st h a tf o rt h ee x i s t e n c ep r o o fo fs e q u e n t i a l
equilibria (Kreps and Wilson 1982). We mention the argument, but for space reasons we do
not give the details of it.
First, assume that in every node h ∈ Hi,p l a y e ri must choose every action ai ∈ Ai(h)w i t h
probability no smaller than ε ( t h i si si ns p i r i to fS e l t e n1 9 7 5 ) . 24 I ti sc l e a rt h a na na n a l o g y -
based expectation equilibrium with such additional constraints must exist. Call (σε,βε)o n e
such pro￿le of strategies and analogy-based expectations. By compactness properties (which
hold in the ￿nite environment case), some subsequence must be converging to say (σ,β),
which is an analogy-based expectation equilibrium.
3V a r i o u s e ﬀects of analogy reasoning
3.1 Analogy reasoning can be good or bad
We wish to illustrate that bundling contingencies by analogy can either bene￿to rh u r ta
player. To this end, we consider the following environment. Two normal form games G and
G0 are being played in parallel. Game G is played with probability ν and game G0 is played
with probability 1 − ν. (In the formulation of Section 2, the game tree Υ consists of a ￿rst
move by Nature about the selection of the game - according to the probabilities ν and 1−ν -
then followed by the normal form game G or G0 accordingly.) There are two players i =1 ,2
in G and G0.I nb o t hG and G0,p l a y e ri must choose an action ai in the same ￿nite action
space Ai.
24This requires amending De￿nition 1 to incorportate such constraints in the maximization programmes.
12I nt h eg a m et r e eΥ, a node can be identi￿ed with a normal form game G or G0. We assume
that player 2 uses the ￿nest partitioning (i.e., player 2 uses two analogy classes {(1,G)} and
{(1,G 0)}).
We wish to compare the equilibrium payoﬀ obtained by player 1 in each of the subgames
G, G0 a c c o r d i n gt ow h e t h e rp l a y e r1u s e st h e￿nest partitioning or the coarsest partitioning
(in the latter case player 1 pools together the two subgames G and G0 into a single class of
analogy {(2,G),(2,G 0)}).
Claim 1: Suppose player 2 has a dominant strategy25 in both games G and G0. Player 1￿s
equilibrium payoﬀ - in both G and G0 - is no smaller when player 1 uses the ￿nest partitioning
as opposed to the coarsest partitioning.
Proof. Whatever the partitioning of player 1, player 2 will in equilibrium select his dominant
strategy in both G and G0.T h e￿nest partitioning of player 1 allows player 1 to pick a best-
response to player 2￿s dominant strategy in both G and G0, which is the highest payoﬀ player
1c a nh o p et og e t( i nb o t hG and G0) given player 2￿s behavior.
Within the context of Claim 1, it is immediate to construct an example in which player 1
￿s equilibrium payoﬀ is strictly lower when he uses the coarse partitioning as opposed to the
￿nest partitioning. (Such an example must be such that player 2 ￿s dominant strategy is not
t h es a m ei ng a m e sG and G0 , and thus player 1￿s analogy-based expectation is not accurate
for games G and G0 in isolation.)
When player 2 has no dominant strategy, however, analogy reasoning may bene￿tp l a y e r
1, as the following example shows.
Example 1: Consider the following situation
LM R
U 5,10 ,12 ,2
D 3,13 ,01 ,0
Game G
LM R
U 3,03 ,11 ,0
D 0,15 ,12 ,2
Game G0
where in each cell the left and right numbers indicate players 1 and 2￿s payoﬀs, respectively.
Both games are assumed to be played with equal probability, i.e. ν = 1
2.I nb o t hG and G0,
the action space of players 1 and 2 are A1 = {U,D} and A2 = {L,M,R}, respectively.
The example is such that both G and G0 have a unique Nash equilibrium, which is UR
in game G and DR in game G0. Thus, when both players use the ￿nest partitioning, player
1g e t sap a y o ﬀ o f2i nb o t hs u b g a m e s .
Suppose now that player 1 uses the coarsest partitioning (while player 2 uses the ￿nest).
The following assessment is an analogy-based expectation equilibrium.
25This dominant strategy need not be the same in both games G and G
0.
13Strategy pro￿le:P l a y e r1p l a y sD in game G and U in game G0.P l a y e r2p l a y sL in game
G and M in game G0.
Analogy-based expectations: Player 1 expects player 2 to play L and M each with proba-
bility 1
2 (in his unique analogy class {(2,G),(2,G 0)}). Player 2 expects player 1 to play D in
game G and U in game G0.
To check that the above assessment is an equilibrium, note that given the strategy pro￿le,
players￿ analogy-based expectations are consistent. Then given player 1￿s analogy-based
expectation, player 1 chooses D (resp. U) rather than U (resp. D)i ng a m eG (resp. G0)
because 1
2(3+3) > 1
2(0+5). Given player 1￿s strategy, player 2￿s best-response is L in game
G and M in game G0.
Finally, note that according to the above strategy pro￿le player 1 gets a payoﬀ of 3 in
both G and G0, which is strictly larger than 2 - the equilibrium payoﬀ obtained by player 1
when he uses the ￿nest partitioning.
The key feature of Example 1 is that player 2 does not play in the same way when player
1u s e st h e￿nest partitioning and when he uses the coarsest partitioning. It is still the case
that the coarseness of player 1￿s partitioning induces player 1 not to optimize against player
2￿s behavior in G and G0 (because the best-response would be U (and not D)i ng a m eG and
D (and not U) in game G0). However, it allows player 1 to ￿nd it optimal to play D (resp. U)
in game G (resp. G0) ,w h i c hi nt u r ni n d u c e sp l a y e r2t op l a ya na c t i o nt h a ti sm o r ef a v o r a b l e
to player 1.
Remark 1: In the analogy-based expectation equilibrium shown in Example 1, both play-
ers 1 and 2 behave diﬀerently in games G and G0. Thus, even by varying the payoﬀ matrix
of games G and G0, it is not possible to interpret the equilibrium outcome as emerging from
an imperfect information (of either player) as to which game (G or G0) is being played.
Remark 2: In Example 1, when player 1 uses the coarsest partitioning, there is also
an equilibrium in which UR is played in game G and DR is played in game G0 as in the
￿nest partitioning case. Modify the speci￿cation of game G so that player 2 has a dominant
strategy which is to play L. It can be checked that when player 1 uses the coarsest partitioning
the assessment shown in Example 1 is the only analogy-based expectation equilibrium in this
modi￿ed example. Thus, in this modi￿ed setup, player 1 bene￿ts from the coarse partitioning
in subgame G0 whatever the equilibrium under consideration.
Remark 3: If one insists on having equilibria that employ pure strategies, player 2 should
have at least three actions for an example of the sort displayed in Example 1 to work.
Otherwise, similar conclusions can be derived with 2x2 games and mixed strategy equilibria.
Comment: I nt h ea b o v es i t u a t i o nw eh a v ea s s u m e dt h a tt h es a m ep l a y e r2w e r et op l a yi n
14both games G and G0. Of course, an alternative interpretation is that the player other than
1i n v o l v e di ng a m eG is not the same as the one involved in game G0, say player 2 in game G
and player 20 in game G0. The partitioning of player 1 considered above corresponds then to
{(2,G),(20,G 0)}. For that interpretation, it is essential to allow player 1 to treat by analogy
nodes in which several diﬀerent players (here players 2 and 20) are involved.
3.2 Centipede game











(a2K,b2K)( a2K−1,b2K−1)( a1,b1) (a2,b2)
(a0,b0)
T2 T1 T2 T1
P2 P1 P2 P1
Figure 1: The centipede game
It is a (2K)-period extensive form game described as follows. There are two players
i =1 ,2 who move in alternate order. In each period, the player whose turn it is to move,
say player i,m a ye i t h e rTake or Pass,i . e .Ai = {Pass,Take}.26 If he Takes, this is the end
o ft h eg a m e .I fh eP a s s e s ,t h eg a m ep r o c e e d st ot h en e x ts t a g ew h e r ei ti st h eo t h e rp l a y e r ￿ s
turn to move unless the game has reached the last period 2K in which case this is the end of
the game. Player 1 moves in the last period 2K, player 2 moves in the last but one period
and so on. Nodes at which player 1 must move are labelled N
(k)
1 , k =1 ,...K where N
(1)
1
designates the last node (i.e., period 2K)a tw h i c hp l a y e r1m u s tm o v e ,N
(2)
1 the last but
o n e ,a n ds oo nt i l lN
(K)
1 the ￿rst node (i.e, period 2) at which player 1 must move. Similarly,
nodes at which player 2 must move are labelled N
(k)
2 , k =1 ,...K where N
(1)
2 designates the
l a s tn o d e( i np e r i o d2 K−1) at which player 2 must move, and N
(K)
2 the ￿rst node (in period
26We implicitly assume in the following that the players label these actions the same way.
151) at which player 2 must move. If player 2 Takes at node N
(k)
2 , the payoﬀst op l a y e r s1a n d
2a r ea2k and b2k, respectively. If player 1 Takes at node N
(k)
1 ,t h ep a y o ﬀst op l a y e r s1a n d
2a r ea2k−1 and b2k−1, respectively. If player 1 Passes at node N
(1)
1 ,t h ep a y o ﬀst op l a y e r s1
and 2 are a0 and b0, respectively. All at and bt, t =0 ,...2K a r ea s s u m e dt ob ei n t e g e r st h a t
satisfy for all k ≥ 1:
a2k−1 >a 2k−2 >a 2k+1 >a 2k (2)
b2k−2 >b 2k−3 >b 2k >b 2k−1
These conditions guarantee that (1) the unique Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE)
of CPK is such that player 2 Takes in the ￿rst period (this follows from a2k+1 >a 2k and
b2k >b 2k−1), and (2) in any period t ≤ 2K −2, both players are better oﬀ if Take occurs two
periods later, i.e. in period t + 2, than if it occurs in the current period t (this follows from
at >a t+2 and bt >b t+2 for all t ≤ 2K − 2).
The prediction of the SPNE sounds relatively unintuitive, especially when the number of
periods 2K is large (because then taking in the ￿rst node seems to induce very severe losses
for both players). As we now illustrate, the analogy approach explains why players may Pass
most of the time in the centipede game, at least for long enough versions of the game.
In order to deal with the eﬀect of increasing the number of periods in CPK, we will
consider in￿nite sequences of integers (ak)∞
k=0,( bk)∞
k=0 satisfying (2). We will also assume
that the diﬀerence between two consecutive payoﬀs is uniformly bounded from above. That
is, there exists ∆ > 0 such that for all t ≥ 0,
|at − at+1| < ∆ and |bt − bt+1| < ∆. (3)
Regarding analogy partitioning, we will mostly consider the case in which both players
use the coarsest partitions as their analogy device. That is, each player i is assumed to pool
together all the nodes N
(k)






j ),1 ≤ k ≤ K
o
.
The strategic environment is thus described by the set of players N = {1,2},t h eg a m et r e e
CPK, players￿ preferences %i as de￿ned by at, bt, and the analogy partitioning structure An
as described by α1 and α2:( N,CPK,%i,An).
Player i￿s analogy-based expectation βi reduces here to a single probability measure
βi(αi)=λi •Pass+(1−λi)•Take∈ ∆Aj, which stands for player i￿s expectation about the
average behavior of player j throughout the game.
16We ￿rst consider assessments (σ,β) such that the strategy of every player is pure (i.e. for






b2k+1 >b 2k+2 for all k ≥ 0. (4)
Proposition 3 Suppose that condition (4) holds, and consider the environment (N,CPK %i
,An). There are two possible equilibrium paths corresponding to self-con￿rming analogy-based
expectation equilibria in pure strategies: Either player 2 Takes in the ￿rst period or the game
reaches period 2K in which player 1 Takes.
Proof. (a) We ￿rst prove that the two mentioned outcomes can be obtained as analogy-based
expectation equilibrium outcomes.
(i) Observe ￿rst that the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium outcome corresponds to
the analogy-based expectation equilibrium (σ,β)i nw h i c hf o ri =1 ,2 , βi(αi)=Take and
σi(N
(k)
i )=Takefor all k =1 ,...K.
(ii) Consider the strategy pro￿le σ such that player 2 Passes always and player 1 Takes
in the last period 2K.
To be consistent with σ, the analogy-based expectation of player 1 must be that player 2
Passes with probability 1, i.e. β1(α1)=Pass (since player 2 Passes always when he has to
move).
To be consistent with σ, the analogy-based expectation of player 2 must be that player
1 Passes with probability K−1
K , since (according to σ) each node N
(k)
1 , k = K,...1 is reached
with probability 1, i.e. Pσ(N
(k)
1 ) = 1, (so that they have equal weighting), and player 1
Passes (with probability 1) in all nodes N
(k)
1 , k = K,...2a n dT a k e si nn o d eN
(1)




The (sequential) best-response of player 1 to the analogy-based expectation β1 is to Take
in the last node N
(1)
1 . Thus, it is to play according to σ1.
When condition (4) holds, the best-response of player 2 to the analogy-based expectation
β2 is to Pass always (since by Taking at N
(k+1)
2 , player 2 would only get b2k+2,w h i c hi s
less than the expected payoﬀ he gets by Passing at N
(k+1)
2 and Taking at N
(k)
2 ,s a y ,i . e .
K−1
K b2k + 1
Kb2k+1 >b 2k+2). Thus, it is to play according to σ2.
Altogether the above considerations show that the assessment (σ,β)i sa na n a l o g y - b a s e d
expectation equilibrium.
(b) It remains to show that there are no other possible outcomes in any pure strategy
self-con￿rming analogy-based expectation equilibrium. Observe ￿rst that if an outcome other
than ￿Player 2 Takes in the ￿rst period￿ emerges (as a self-con￿rming analogy-based expecta-
tion equilibrium outcome), it must correspond to an analogy-based expectation equilibrium
17outcome. (This is because the unique analogy class of every player is then reached with
strictly positive probability.)
Consider the outcome in which player i Takes at node N
(k)
i ,a n dN
(k)
i diﬀers from N
(K)
2 .I f
a pure strategy analogy-based expectation equilibrium leads to that outcome, it must be (by
consistency) that player i￿s analogy based expectation satis￿es βi(αi)=Pass,s i n c eo nt h e
equilibrium path, player j would always Pass. Player i￿s best response to such a βi depends
on whether i = 1 or 2. If i = 1, player 1￿s best response to β1(α1)=Pass is to Take at
node N
(1)
1 (which corresponds to an outcome already identi￿ed as a possible analogy-based
expectation equilibrium outcome). If i = 2, player 2￿s best response to β2(α2)=Pass is to
Pass always, which is in contradiction with player 2 Taking at node N
(k)
2 .
Finally, the outcome in which both players Pass in every period cannot be an analogy-
based expectation equilibrium outcome because whatever player 1￿s expectation, player 1
strictly prefers Taking at node N
(1)
1 to Passing always.
Comment 1: The two outcomes mentioned in Proposition 3 remain equilibrium outcomes
even if player 1 uses a partitioning other than the coarsest, as long as player 2 uses the
coarsest partitioning.27
Comment 2: Consider the case where player 2 uses the coarsest partitioning and player 1
uses the ￿nest partitioning (and condition (4) holds). As mentioned in Comment 1, Take by
player 1 in the last node can be sustained as the equilibrium outcome of an analogy-based
expectation equilibrium. Note that in this equilibrium, player 2 behaves in the same way in
every node where he must move, which is to be related to his bundling of all nodes in which
player 1 must move into a single class of analogy. We will suggest such a principle for re￿ning
analogy-based expectation equilibria in Section 4.
Proposition (3) leaves open what happens when condition (4) does not hold.28 And it
does not deal with equilibria in mixed strategies. The next Proposition provides the main
missing information (still assuming that conditions (2) and (3) hold):
Proposition 4 There exists an integer m such that for all K>m:( 1 )(N,CPK,%i,An) has
an analogy-based expectation equilibrium (σ,β) in which each player i Passes with probability
27If one additionally requires that for all k, b2k <
b2k−1+b2k−2
2 , then these are the only possible outcomes of
self-con￿rming analogy-based expectation equilibria in pure strategies. (The point is that for a pure outcome




2. But, then the best-response of player 2 to β2(α2)=λ
2Pass+(1−λ
2)Takeis to Pass always,
thus leading to the wished conclusion.)
28Take at the last node may then fail to be the outcome of an analogy-based expectation equilibrium in




Kb1 >b 2 (because then player 2 would strictly
prefer Taking in the last but one node rather than Passing always).
181 in the ￿rst K − m nodes, i.e. in every N
(k)
i , k = K,...K − m.( 2 ) A n y s e l f - c o n ￿rming
analogy-based expectation equilibrium of (N,CPK,%i,An) in which each player i Passes with
probability 1 in the ￿rst node N
(K)
i is such that each player i Passes with probability 1 in the
￿rst K − m nodes, i.e. in every N
(k)
i , k = K,...K − m.
Proof. (1) Suppose βi(αi)=λi.Pass +( 1− λi).Take with λi ≥ 1
2 for i =1 ,2. Under
condition (3),29 it is readily veri￿ed that there exists an integer m such that for all K>m,
player i￿s best-response to βi requires Passing (with probability 1) in the ￿rst K − m moves
( a tl e a s t )( b e c a u s ef o rs o m ea p p r o p r i a t e l ys p e c i ￿ed m, Taking earlier is dominated by never
Taking).
Suppose that players 1 and 2 Pass with probability 1 in the ￿rst node where they must
move. The consistency condition implies that the analogy-based expectation of player i,
βi(αi)=λi.Pass +( 1− λi).Take, should satisfy λi ≥ 1
2.
Together these two observations imply that the mapping
β =( β1,β2) →
Best-response
σ =( σ1,σ2) →
Consistency
(β1 hσi,β2 hσi)
has a ￿xed point such that λi ≥ 1
2 for i =1 ,2. Given the best-response to such analogy-based
expectations, we may conclude.
(2) Suppose player i￿s strategy requires him to Pass with probability 1 in node N
(K)
i
for i =1 ,2. By the consistency requirement it should be that player i￿s analogy-based
expectation βi(αi)=λi.Pass +( 1−λi).Take satis￿es λi ≥ 1
2 for i =1 ,2. The best-response
to βi is to Pass at least in the ￿rst K − m where he must move.
Proposition 4 (1) shows that irrespective of the length 2K of the game, there is an
equilibrium (possibly in mixed strategies) in which Take occurs in a ￿nite number of periods
toward the end of the game.30 Proposition 4 (2) shows that there cannot be equilibria in
which Take occurs in the middle phase of the game (i.e. between period 3 and period 2K−2).
Comment 1: A prediction of the analogy setup (at least with the coarsest partitioning
and restricting attention to equilibria in which Take never occurs in the ￿rst two periods)
is that, by increasing the length of CPK, the length of the end phase - in which Take may
occur - can never grow above some ￿xed and bounded value.
Comment 2: It should be noted that the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium outcome is
also an analogy-based expectation equilibrium outcome (in which Player 1 Takes in N
(K)
1
expecting player 2 to Take in α1). And that there is another equilibrium in mixed strategies
29Since all payoﬀs are integers satisfying (2), the diﬀerences at − at+2, bt − bt+2 are no smaller than 2.
30When condition (4) does not hold, this may involve an equilibrium in mixed strategies.
19in which Take may occur in the ￿rst two periods (it is such that each player i =1 ,2 plays in
mixed strategies in N
(K)
i and Takes with probability 1 in all other nodes).
We now consider a slight modi￿cation of the environment in which the Subgame Perfect
Nash Equilibrium is no longer an equilibrium and Take can only occur toward the end of the
game. Speci￿cally, assume the players not only play game CPK, but also another game that
is the same as game CPK except that there are only two moves corresponding to Player 1
passing or not to the middle of the game and Player 2 passing or not from the middle to
t h ee n do ft h eg a m e . F o r m a l l y ,l e tK be an odd number. Consider the game tree Υ such
that in stage 0 Nature selects either game CPK with probability νCP > 0o rg a m eF with
probability νF > 0 where game F is described as follows.
Game F has the same two players i =1 ,2a sCPK and two moves. Player 2 moves in the
￿rst node denoted by M2.A tn o d eM2, player 2 must choose an action in A2 = {Pass,Take}.
If player 2 Takes, the game ends, players 1 and 2￿ payoﬀsa r ea2K and b2K, respectively. If
player 2 Passes, the game moves to node M1 where it is player 1￿s turn to move. Player 1
must choose an action in A1 = {Pass,Take}. If player 1 Takes, this is the end of the game
and the payoﬀs of players 1 and 2 are aK and bK, respectively; if he Passes, this is also the
e n do ft h eg a m ea n dt h ep a y o ﬀst op l a y e r s1a n d2a r ea0 and b0, respectively. We assume
that K is larger than 2 so that a0 >a K >a 2K and b0 >b K >b 2K.





j ),1 ≤ k ≤ K
o[
{(j,Mj)}
and we call (N,Υ,%i,An) the associated environment.
Proposition 5 Suppose that conditions (2) and (3) hold. There exists an integer m such that
for all K>m, all self-con￿rming analogy-based expectation equilibria (σ,β) of (N,Υ,%i,An)
are such that player i Passes with probability 1 in Mi and in every N
(k)
i , k = K,...K − m.
Proof. In game F, whatever their analogy-based expectation, each player i chooses optimally
to Pass. This ensures that the analogy-based expectation of player i, βi(αi)=λi.Pass +
(1−λi).Take satis￿es λi ≥ νF > 0f o ri =1 ,2. Given condition (3), this ensures that, for K
large enough, the best-response in CPK of each player i is at least to Pass in the ￿rst node
where he must move, thus ensuring that λi > 1
2 for i =1 ,2. We may then conclude using the
b e s t - r e s p o n s ea r g u m e n ti nt h ep r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 .
In the above analysis of the centipede game CPK, we assumed that players use the coarsest
analogy partitioning. However, the insight that analogy reasoning may lead players to Pass
m o s to ft h et i m ei nl o n ge n o u g hCPK would in general carry over, even when players use
more than one analogy class.













j )s u c ht h a tk<k
o
according to whether the end phase or the main phase of the game is being considered, and
call (N,CPK,%i,An) the corresponding environment.
Proposition 6 There exist m and an analogy-based-expectation equilibrium of (N,CPK,%i
,An) such that, for all K,e a c hp l a y e ri Passes with probability 1 at least in the ￿rst K − m
nodes where he must move.
Proof. If k−1
k b2k + 1
kb2k+1 >b 2k+2 for all k ≤ k, then Player 1 Taking in the last node
N
(1)
1 is an analogy-based expectation equilibrium outcome (this follows from the analysis in
Proposition 3).
Otherwise, using the argument in the proof of Proposition 4, it is readily veri￿ed that there
is m such that for, K large enough, there is an equilibrium (σ,β) satisfying (1) βi(αmain
i )=
λi,main•Pass+(1−λi,main)•Takewith λi,main ≥ 1
2 for i =1 ,2, and (2) player i￿s best-response
to βi is to Pass with probability 1 at least in the ￿rst K − m moves.
3.3 (Finitely) Repeated Prisoner￿s Dilemma
Consider the Prisoner￿s Dilemma PD whose matrix payoﬀ is represented as:
DC
D 0,01 + g1,−l2
C −l1,1+g2 1,1
Game PD
with li, gi > 0f o ri =1 ,2, where each player i =1 ,2 has to choose simultaneously an action
in {D,C}. We now consider several variants of repeated PD.T h e￿rst two variants illustrate
how analogy reasoning may give rise to (non-trivial) end eﬀects in the ￿nitely repeated PD.
The third variant deals with the in￿nite repetition.
T-repetition: We ￿rst consider the T repetition of PDwith no discount factor, and we
denote by PDT the corresponding game tree. Nodes in PDT correspond to histories of length
0t oT specifying the action pro￿les played in earlier periods (if any). The history of length










i ∈ {D,C} stands for the action played by player i in period k.
21We consider the following analogy partitioning. Player 1 partitions the set of (2,h)i n t o
two classes:31
α1 = {(2,h) | h contains no D or h = ∅}
α0
1 = {(2,h) | h contains at least one D}
Player 2 is assumed to use the ￿nest partitioning of the set of (1,h). We refer to An as
the corresponding partitioning, to N = {1,2} as the set of players, and to %i as player i￿s
preferences over outcomes in PDT (as induced by the above matrix function and the no
discounting assumption).
Proposition 7 For T suﬃciently large, the path (a(k))T
k=1 with a(k) =( C,C) for all k ≤ T −
2, a(T−1) =( C,D) and a(T) =( D,D) is the equilibrium path of an analogy-based expectation
equilibrium of (N,PDT,%i,An).
Proof. Suppose the proposed path corresponds to the analogy-based expectation equilibrium










For T large enough (so that T−2
T−1 is suﬃciently close to 1), player 1￿s best-response σ1 to β1 is
to play D in the last period T or33 whenever one (or more) D has been played before. And
to play C otherwise.34
Player 2￿s best-response σ2 to σ1 is to play D whenever one (or more) D has been played
b e f o r ea n di nt h el a s tt w op e r i o d sT − 1a n dT. And to play C otherwise.35
The proof is completed by noting that the path generated by (σ1,σ2) corresponds to the
assumed path.
Remark 1: It is interesting to observe that in class α1 (resp. α0
1), Player 1 behaves in
the same way in all histories h reached along the equilibrium path and such that (2,h) ∈ α1
(resp. α0
1).
31History h =( a
(1),...,a




32Note that the two analogy classes of player 1 are reached on this path.
33Playing D in the last period T is optimal whatever the expectation (it is a dominant strategy).
34To see this, consider (the worst case at) period T − 1 in which player 1 is supposed to play C.I f
he plays C (planning to play D next), his expected continuation payoﬀ (given his expectation) is close to
1 +( 1 + g1) (corresponding to (C,D),(C,C). If he plays D (anticipating (D,D) will occur afterwards) his
expected continuation payoﬀ is close to (1 + g1) + 0 (corresponding to (D,D),(C,D), which is smaller.
35Player 2 ￿nds it optimal to play D in period T − 1 b e c a u s eh ek n o w st h a ti na n yc a s ep l a y e r1 will play
D in the last period - he is fully rational.
22Remark 2: Suppose Player 2 uses the partitioning An2 of {(1,h)} obtained from An1 by
exchanging the roles of players 1 and 2. Then the path ((C,C),...,(C,C),(D,D)) can be
sustained as an analogy-based expectation equilibrium path.
Stochastic T-repetition: We now consider a variant of PDT with T periods and no
discounting, but such that in each period there is a draw by Nature to determine the value
of each gi for the current period (the values of li are assumed to remain constant throughout
the game). To ￿x ideas, we assume that the distributions are independent from period to
period and accross players, and that in each period, gi takes value g with probability ν and
g with probability ν where ν +ν =1 . 36 We denote by z(t) the joint draw of (g1,g 2)i np e r i o d
t, and we assume that players are risk neutral. We denote by PDs the associated game tree,
and by %i player i￿s preferences.
Nodes in PDs correspond to histories of length 0 to T specifying the action pro￿les
played in earlier periods (if any) and the draws by Nature in all periods up to (and including)
the current period. That is, the history of length 0 is z(1) specifying the draws g1 and g2



















i ∈ {D,C} stands for the action played by






stands for the period k draw of gi.
Each player i partitions the set of (j,h) into two classes:37
αi = {(j,h) | h contains no D}
α0
i = {(j,h) | h contains at least one D}
We de￿ne uT =1+( ν • g + ν • g), and the sequence (ut)t<T recursively by38
ut =1+( ν • ut+1 + ν • g).
We assume that uT < g and that no xt in this sequence is equal to g (which is satis￿ed
generically). We de￿ne m as the integer such that uT−m+1 < g<u T−m.( N o t et h a tm is no
larger than g,s i n c eut − ut+1 > 1a sl o n ga sut+1 < g.)
36To keep in line with the class of games considered in Section 2, we assume that the draws of both g1 and
g2 are immediately revealed to both players. However, this is immaterial for the analysis below.





(t+1)) is said to contain at least one D if there exist i = 1,2a n d
k ≤ t such that a
(k)
i = D. It is said to contain no D otherwise.
38ut stands for the expected payoﬀ of player i at date t − 1 when no C previously occurred and player i
anticipates that (1)h ew i l lp l a yD in the next period if gi = g (or if t = T) and that (2) player j plays C if
no D previously occurred and D otherwise.
23Proposition 8 For T large enough, the following strategy pro￿le is part of an analogy-based
expectation equilibrium of (N,PDs,%i,An):For each player i,p l a yD if one (or more) D
occurred so far; Otherwise, in all periods t, t<T−m,p l a yC;i na l lp e r i o d st, T−m<t<T,
play C if g
(t)
i = g and D if g
(t)
i = g;i np e r i o dT,p l a yD.
Proof. Given the assumed strategy pro￿le σ and given that m is no larger than g,f o rT
large enough, the analogy-based expectations βi hσi that is consistent with σ should satisfy:
βi hσi(αi) ≈ C
βi hσi(α0
i)=D
It can be checked that the best-response to such a βi hσi is indeed σi.39
The logic of the equilibrium is as follows. Players rightly perceive that in class α0
i,i . e .i f
some D was played earlier, only D can be expected next. In class αi,p l a y e rj chooses C most
of the time except toward reaching the end of the game: player i￿ expectation is thus close to
C in this class. Given such an expectation, player i considers breaking the sequence of C -b y
playing D - only when the immediate gain gi from playing D is not too small relative to the
loss incurred by triggering a D sequence. This occurs only toward the end of the game (i.e.
in the last m + 1 periods) when the draw of gi is g (and also in the last period irrespective
of the realization of g
(T)
i ).
Remark 1: The same result as in Proposition 8 carries over if the two classes considered by
player i are now such that αi contains only those (j,h)s u c ht h a tp l a y e ri (and not necessarily
player j)h a sn e v e rp l a y e dD so far.
Remark 2: The above results suggest that analogy reasoning may provide an explana-
tion for the experimental evidence40 that players initially cooperate in the ￿nitely repeated
prisoner￿s dilemma and that there is an end eﬀect in which players sometimes behave oppor-
tunistically (from period T − m to period T).
Inﬁnite repetition: We brie￿yc o n s i d e rt h ei n ￿nitely repeated prisoner￿s dilemma in
w h i c hb o t hp l a y e r sh a v et h es a m ed i s c o u n tf a c t o rδ, g1 = g2 = g>0a n dl1 = l2 = l>0.
T h ea s s o c i a t e dg a m et r e ei sd e n o t e db yPDδ,a n dp l a y e ri￿s preference is denoted by %i.
As a preliminary comment, we ￿rst observe that a cooperative outcome may emerge for
some analogy partitioning, but not for others. We let αi denote player i￿s partitioning of
(j,h)w h e r eh =( a(1),...,a(t))i sat-length history of action pro￿les.
39The sequence ut has been constructed precisely for that purpose.
40See Selten-Stoecker (1986), but also McKelvey-Palfrey (1992), Nagel-Tang (1998).
24Suppose player i￿s partitioning Ani bears only over the actions played by player j.T h a t
is, if h and h0 involve the same sequence of actions of player i, (j,h)a n d( j,h0)b e l o n gt o
the same analogy class. Then the only path that can be sustained as an analogy-based
expectation equilibrium of (N,PDδ,%i,An) is the repetition of (D,D).
The point is that due to player i￿s partitioning, player i will play D irrespective of his
expectation, since there is no eﬀect identi￿ed by player i of i￿s own actions on j￿s behavior.
As a result, only the repetition of (D,D) can emerge.
O fc o u r s e ,i fe a c hp l a y e ri partitions the set of (j,h)a c c o r d i n gt o
αi = {(j,h) | h contains no D}
α0
i = {(j,h) | h contains at least one D}
then the trigger strategy pro￿le in which each player i plays C whenever no D was played so
far and plays D otherwise is part of an analogy-based expectation equilibrium of (N,PDδ,%i
,An).41
In the above examples, it is readily veri￿ed that the analogy-based expectation equilibria
(σ,β)o f( N,PDδ,%i,An)a r es u c ht h a tσ is a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium of PDδ.
We now show that this need not be the case.
Example 2: Assume that 1−l>1
2(1+g). Player 2 uses the ￿nest partitioning of (1,h).
Player 1 partitions (2,h) into two classes:
α1 =
n







1 = {(j,h) | (j,h) / ∈ α1}
De￿ne the following strategy pro￿le σ:
1 .F o rp l a y e r1 :P l a yD if at least one (D,C) occurred so far or if player 2 played D in
two consecutive periods in the past. Play C otherwise.
2 . F o rp l a y e r2 :P l a yD if at least one (D,C) occurred so far or if player 2 played D in two
consecutive periods in the past or if the last action pro￿le is (C,C). Play C otherwise.





Claim 2: For δ close enough to 1, (σ,β) is an analogy-based expectation equilibrium of
(N,PDδ,%i,An). Yet, σ is not a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium of PDδ.
41The associated analogy-based expectations are: βi(αi)=C and βi(α
0
i)=D.
42β2 can be identi￿ed with σ1 as player 2 uses the ￿nest partitioning.
25Proof. The path generated by σ (starting from the nul history) is an alternation of (C,C)
and (C,D). Hence, the expression for β1(α1). (β1(α0
1)=D is the correct expectation.) It is
readily veri￿ed that σ2 is a best-response to σ1. After an (D,C)o c c u r so rp l a y e r2p l a y e dD
in two consecutive periods, each player i￿s strategy requires playing D. Note that even player
1￿ expectation is correct in this case, and the requirements for equilibrium are satis￿ed. In
all other events and if the last action played by player 2 was C (resp. D), player 1 expects













(As δ gets close to 1, uD ≈ (−l +1 )a n duC ≈ 2(−l +1 ) .)I fp l a y e r1p l a y sD instead of C




2(1 + g)). When 1 − l>1
2(1 + g), player 1 prefers playing C in both cases.
The strategy pro￿le σ is not a SPNE because player 1 should optimally prefer playing D
rather than C on the equilibrium path when the last action pro￿le is (C,C).
The eﬀect of player 1￿s treatment by analogy here is to allow to sustain strategy pro￿les
in which player 1 is not punished after every deviation player 1 may consider. (In the above
example, player 1 is not punished if he plays D instead of C w h e np l a y e r2i ss u p p o s e dt op l a y
D.) Player 1 conforms to the prescribed strategy because he perceives an average punishment
in case of deviation (even if in some events there would be no actual punishment).
3.4 Bargaining and ultimatum games
In this subsection we wish to illustrate the eﬀect of analogy reasoning in situations where the
action spaces are large at least in some nodes. A simple example is provided by the following
Take-it-or-Leave-it model. There are two players i =1 ,2a n dap i eo fs i z e1 .P l a y e r1m a k e s
a partition oﬀer (x,1 − x), x ∈ [0,1] to player 2 who may either accept or reject it.43 If he
accepts, players 1 and 2 get x and 1 − x, respectively. If player 2 rejects the oﬀer, player 1
gets 0 and player 2 gets an outside option payoﬀ equal to vout,w h e r e0<v out < 1. Call
N = {1,2} the set of players, %i player i￿s preferences, and TLt h eg a m et r e ea s s o c i a t e dw i t h
the above setup.
43The action space of player 1 in this example is continuous (which is not covered by the framework of
Section 2). The analysis presented below can be viewed as corresponding to the limit of the ￿nite grid case
as the grid becomes ￿ner and ￿ner. (Alternatively, one can easily extend the de￿nitions of consistency and of
analogy-based expectation equilibrium for this speci￿ce x a m p l e . )
26Standard analysis suggests that player 1 will propose (1−vout,vout) and that player 2 will
accept it. When player 1 forms his expectation about player 2￿s probability of acceptance by
analogy, we now show that it may well be that either player 1 makes a much more generous
oﬀer than vout to player 2 or that player 1 makes an oﬀer that is rejected by player 2 depending
on the partitioning.
Speci￿cally, a node in TL at which player 2 must move can be identi￿ed with x where
(x,1 − x)i st h eo ﬀer made by player 1. We assume that player 1 partitions the set of (2,x)
into two classes:44
αlow
1 = {(2,x) | x<x≤ 1}
α
high




1 ) corresponds to the class of outrageous (resp. generous) oﬀers.
Proposition 9 (1) When 1 − x<v out, any analogy-based expectation equilibrium is such
that there is no agreement: player 1 gets 0,p l a y e r2 gets vout.( 2 )W h e nvout < 1 − x,t h e r e
is a unique analogy-based expectation equilibrium in which player 1 proposes (x,1−x),w h i c h
is accepted by player 2.
Proof. The analogy-based expectation of player 1 is of the form β1(αr
1)=λr•￿Accepts￿+(1−
λr)•￿Rejects￿ with r = low, high.I f λhigh > 0( r e s p . λlow > 0), player 1￿s best-response to
β1 cannot be to oﬀer (x,1 − x)w i t hx<x (resp. x<1). (1) When 1 − x<v out,n e i t h e r
(1,0) nor (x,1 − x) are acceptable by player 2. Only a disagreement can occur. (2) When
vout < 1 − x, λhigh =1 ,λlow = 0, player 1 proposing (x,1 − x) and player 2 accepting any
oﬀer (x,1 − x)w i t h1− x ≥ vout gives rise to an analogy-based expectation equilibrium. It
is also immediate to check that there is no other analogy-based expectation equilibrium.
Comment 1: The analysis of Proposition 9 is pretty similar to the one that would arise if
player 1 could only propose a partition oﬀer in {(x,1 − x),(1,0)}. Thus the analogy reasoning
here has the eﬀect (through the working of the best-response correspondence) of reducing the
oﬀers considered by player 1 in equilibrium.
Comment 2: Another setup which would give similar insights is one in which the respon-
der would not distinguish within the set of high oﬀers (i.e., oﬀers x such that x ≤ x)n o r
within the set of low oﬀers (i.e., oﬀers x such that x>x).45 However, in a slightly more
elaborate model in which player 1 could not pick a deterministic oﬀer, but could only aﬀect
44The intervals are closed as indicated to guarantee the existence of an equilibrium.
45See Dow (1991), Meyer (1991) and Rubinstein (1993) for investigations of coarse informational partition-
ings of this sort.
27the distribution of oﬀers received by player 2, then the two approaches would have diﬀerent
behavioral implications.46
To give a further illustration of the eﬀect of analogy reasoning in this kind of contexts,
consider the following bargaining game (see Rubinstein 1982). There are two players i =1 ,2
and a pie of size 1. Players alternate in making oﬀers. Player 1 starts, and makes an oﬀer
(x1,1 − x1), x ∈ [0,1] to player 2 who may either accept or reject it. If he accepts, players
1a n d2g e tx1 and 1 − x1, respectively. If player 2 rejects the oﬀer, player 2 makes an oﬀer
(1 − x2,x 2) to player 1 and so on. Players are assumed to discount future payoﬀsa c c o r d i n g
to the same discount factor δ.C a l lN = {1,2} the set of players, %i player i￿s preferences,
and R t h eg a m et r e e .
Standard analysis suggests that player 1 will propose ( 1
1+δ, δ
1+δ) and that player 2 will
accept it immediately. We now show that when players reason by analogy, an agreement
need not be reached immediately resulting in severe eﬃciency losses.
Nodes in which player 1 (resp. 2) must move are of two types: nodes in which player









2 )i nw h i c hp l a y e r1( r e s p . 2 )m u s tr e s p o n dt oa no ﬀer (1 − x2,x 2)( r e s p .
(x1,1−x1)). We assume that each player i uses three classes to categorize the nodes at which












(j,h) | h = h
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(j,h) | h = h
resp
j and i￿s current oﬀer xi ∈ [0,xi]
o
One can show:47
Proposition 10 Suppose that x1 +x2 > 1 and let δ be suﬃciently close to 1.T h ef o l l o w i n g
assessment (σ,β) is an analogy-based expectation equilibrium of (N,R,%i,An).P l a y e r i￿s
strategy: Propose xi for himself (and 1 − xi for player j), Accept with probability pi the
oﬀer 1 − xj of player j, Reject (Accept) any oﬀer strictly below (above) 1 − xi.P l a y e r i￿s
46For the sake of illustration, suppose player 1 chooses x (as in the main presentation). When player 1
chooses x,p l a y e r2r e c e i v e st h eo ﬀer (x,1−x) with a large probability, but also any oﬀer (y,1−y)w i t hy>x
with a small probability. We assume the same partitioning (regarding the oﬀer eﬀectively received by player
2) as in the main text and 1 − x<v
out. When the responder has a coarse perception, he will reject any oﬀer
(y,1 − y), y ≤ x, whereas in the analogy setup he will accept oﬀers (y,1 − y) whenever 1 − y>v
out.H e n c e ,
the non equivalence: in the analogy setup, player 1 will pick x, and sometimes with small probability the deal
will be accepted; in the coarse perception setup, there will never be any agreement.
47The probability pi is determined so that player j is indiﬀerent between accepting 1−xi today and having
his oﬀer of 1 − xj accepted with probability pi tomorrow (and otherwise accepting 1 − xj aftertomorrow).
28expectation: βi(α
off
i ) is the oﬀer 1 − xj, βi(αlow
i )= ￿Rejects￿, βi(α
high
i )=pj￿Accepts￿+(1 −




Comment 1: In this equilibrium as δ gets close to 1, each player i gets approximately
1 − xj,w h i c hr e s u l t si na ne ﬃciency loss of x1 + x2 − 1.
Comment 2: In the usual Rubinstein (1982)￿s argument, if player j￿s continuation payoﬀ
is (approximately) 1 − xi,p l a y e ri could get xi − ε by oﬀering 1 − xi + ε to player j.I no u r
analogy setup, player j w o u l da l s oa c c e p ts u c ha no ﬀer with probability 1. However, due to
his analogy partitioning, player i perceives that the probability of acceptance of such an oﬀer
is only pi exactly the same as for the oﬀer 1−xi. Given such an expectation, player i prefers
oﬀering 1 − xi rather than 1 − xi + ε.48
4 Discussion
4.1 Link with other solution concepts
We have already illustrated the diﬀerences between the analogy-based expectation equilibrium
and the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium in a number of applications (see Section 3). We
have also noted the fundamental conceptual distinction between the notion of information
set in multi-stage games with incomplete information and the notion of analogy class as
d e v e l o p e di nS e c t i o n2 .( T h e yr e f e rt op a r t i t i o n i n go fd i ﬀerent sets, see Section 2.)
Consider now the notion of imperfect recall in which a player need not remember which
actions he chose in the past (see Rubinstein 1991, Piccione-Rubinstein 1997, and also Dulleck-
Oechssler 1997 for an application to the centipede game).49 Consider again the centipede
game CPK d e s c r i b e di ns u b s e c t i o n3 . 2 .B u ta s s u m et h a te a c hp l a y e ri =1 ,2d o e snot know at
which node N
(k)
i , k =1 ,...K he currently is (whereas players no longer form their expectations
by analogy). For K large enough, an equilibrium in this setting is that each player i Passes







48The insight we get here is similar to the one that would arise if each player i could only propose 1−xi to
player j. There is some parallel with the eﬀect of ￿nite grids in bargaining as analyzed in van Damme-Selten-
Winter (1990) (who focus on the multiplicity issue). However, the grid resulting from the analogy partitioning
need not be the same for the two players (nor need it be ￿ne, as considered by these authors). Also, the
analogy treatment forces here stationarity in the form of the equilibrium, which is not implied by the ￿nite
grid treatment.
49One can argue that games with imperfect recall fall in the class of games with incomplete information
(see the discussion in Piccione-Rubinstein 1997).
50The point is that player i cannot adjust the best time for Taking, as he does not know in which N
(k)
i he
currently is. He prefers Passing always in this case.
29Imperfect recall explains in this case why players may Pass all the time in the centipede
game. However, it does so by assuming that players do not perceive that there is an end (since
players are assumed not to know at which node they currently are). In the analogy approach
developed in subsection 3.2, players do know at which node they currently are. They Pass
initially because they do not have an accurate expectation about when their opponent will
Take (they only have an expectation about the average behavior of their opponent all over
the game). Also, players do perceive that there is an end, as they consider Taking toward
reaching the end of the game. Thus the two approaches have a very diﬀerent interpretation,
and only the analogy approach captures (in an endogenous way) the end eﬀect in the ￿nite
horizon paradoxes.
Can the solution concept de￿ned in Section 2 receive an alternative interpretation?51 As
we have just suggested, the relation to imperfect recall (or incomplete information) is not
clear. But, what about a situation in which players would erroneously believe that the other
players do not have perfect information, and yet all players would have perfect information.
Classical game theory does not provide a clue about how to model such situations. But
maybe (restricting attention to two player games), one can interpret the analogy classes αi
de￿ned in Section 2 as the ￿ctitious information sets assigned to player j by player i,52 and
propose the corresponding equilibrium (see De￿nition 4) as the appropriate concept for this
case.
Here is a problem though with this interpretation: Suppose that in equilibrium both (j,h)
and (j,h0)i nαi are reached with positive probability. And that player j does not behave in
t h es a m ew a yi nh and h0. In principle, player i could check ex post (or statistically after
many plays of the game) that player j does not behave in the same way in h and h0, violating
i￿s premise that h and h0 are in the same information set of j.W o u l d p l a y e r i continue to
hold such a belief about player j￿s information structure in such a case?53
Remark: With this interpretation, if one adds the requirement that player j should behave
i nt h es a m ew a yi na l ln o d e sh and h0 reached in equilibrium and such that (j,h)a n d( j,h0)
belong to the same αi, then the play must correspond to that of a self-con￿rming equilibrium
(which need not be the case in general with the analogy-based expectation equilibrium).54
51I would like to thank a referee for suggesting the following interpretation.
52With this interpretation, it seems odd to pool together (j,h)a n d( j
0,h
0)w i t hj 6= j
0 as the general setup
of Section 2 allows it, hence the restriction to two-player games.
53If player i does not even think of checking whether player j behaves (statistically) in the same way in h
and h
0 , the proposed concept seems to make sense, but the interpretation then gets closer to that of analogy
reasoning in that player i is satis￿ed with a partial expectation about player j￿s behavior.
54The only self-con￿rming equilibrium in the centipede game CPK requires player 1 Taking in the ￿rst node
(and see the analysis in subsection 3.2).
304.2 Two principles on analogy partitioning
No structure was imposed so far on the analogy categorization. Understanding how individ-
uals categorize contingencies to form their expectations is clearly beyond the scope of this
paper (it is at the heart of a large body of the ongoing research of cognitive scientists, see
Holyoak-Thagard 1995 and Dunbar 2000, for example). As a modest game-theoretic inves-
tigation, we now review two principles (for analogy partitionings) that may alternatively be
viewed as attempts to re￿ne the concept of analogy-based expectation equilibrium.
Analogy expectation and similar play:
An appealing idea seems to be that in order for player i to pool several nodes (j,h)i n t o
a single class of analogy, player i should himself consider playing in the same way in some
pool of nodes. One diﬃculty is that in general player i need not move in the same nodes as
player j, and therefore one should also worry about which nodes h0 ∈ Hi player i considers
as being similar to nodes h ∈ Hj.
A class of situations in which this issue can be addressed simply is one in which whenever
player i bundles two elements (j,h)a n d( j0,h 0) into the same analogy class αi,p l a y e ri also
has to move in h and h0. And player i plays the same behavioral strategy at nodes h and h0.
We distinguish according to whether this property should be met only for histories reached
along the played path or for all histories.55
In the ￿nitely repeated prisoner￿s dilemma PDT in which player 1 uses two classes of
analogy α1, α0
1, (according to whether or not at least one D was played earlier) and player 2
uses the ￿nest partition, we observed (see Remark 1 after Proposition 7) that for all histories
h met along the played path, whenever (2,h) ∈ α1 (resp. α0
1), player 1 plays the same action
C (resp. D)a tn o d eh. Thus, the property is met for all histories h reached along the played
path.56
The next example is such that the property is met for all histories (whether on or oﬀ the
equilibrium path), and yet the play diﬀers from that of the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilib-
rium:
Example 3: Consider the following two-stage two-player game. Player 1 moves ￿rst and
chooses between the normal form game G or G0.I n b o t h G and G0,p l a y e r s1a n d2m o v e
simultaneously, and in both G and G0,p l a y e r1c h o o s e si nA1 = {U,D},p l a y e r2c h o o s e si n
{L,R}. W ea s s u m et h a tU is a dominant strategy in both G and G0 f o rp l a y e r1 . P l a y e r
2￿s best-response to U is R in game G, whereas it is L in game G0. Finally, we assume that
55One might argue that a player is more likely to have doubts about his analogy partitioning if the property
is violated on the equilibrium path histories.





for all t, in which player i would play D (and not C as for the other histories in α1).
31player 1 derives a higher payoﬀ when (U,R)i sp l a y e di ng a m eG than when (U,L)i sp l a y e d
in game G0. And that player 1 derives a higher payoﬀ when (U,L)i sp l a y e di ng a m eG0 than
when (U,L)i sp l a y e di ng a m eG.
The unique Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium is such that player 1 chooses game G and
then (U,R) occurs (this yields player 1 more than (U,L)i nG0).
Suppose that player 1 puts in the same analogy class (2,G)a n d( 2 ,G 0)i no r d e rt op r e d i c t
player 2￿s behavior. Note ￿r s tt h a tp l a y e r1b e h a v e si nt h es a m ew a yi nG and G0 (he has the
same dominant strategy in both games). Thus, the required property is satis￿ed. Second, it
is readily veri￿ed that an equilibrium outcome in this analogy setting is that player 1 chooses
G0 (expecting player 2 to play L in both G and G0), since player 1 prefers (U,L) in game G0
rather than (U,L) in game G.
All analogy classes must be reached:
Another property that may be of interest is that players structure their analogy classes
so that each analogy class is reached with positive probability in equilibrium.57 The next
Proposition provides some insight about the eﬀect of this principle in the centipede game
CPK considered in subsection 3.2.
Proposition 11 Let (σ,β) be an analogy-based expectation equilibrium of (N,CPK,%i,An)
where N = {1,2} denotes the set of players, %iplayer i￿s preferences, and An the partitioning
pro￿le used by the players. Suppose that for all k, 1
2ak−2+ 1
2ak−1 >a k and 1
2bk−2+ 1
2bk−1 >
bk.I fσ employs only pure strategies, and all analogy classes of both players are reached with
positive probability according to σ, then the equilibrium outcome is that player 1 Takes in
the last node N
(1)
1 .
Proof. Take at node N
(1)
1 is a possible equilibrium outcome when players use the coarsest
partition (see subsection 3.2). Since all classes of both players are then reached with positive
probability, this outcome can be sustained in the way required by the Proposition.
Suppose that another outcome, i.e. player i Takes at node N
(k)
i with (i,k) 6=( 1 ,1), were
to emerge with the same requirements.
First, it cannot be that this outcome corresponds to the Subgame Perfect Nash Equi-
librium outcome, since then no node N
(k)
1 would be reached, and thus at least one of the
analogy classes of player 2 would not be reached in equilibrium.
If player i were to Pass at node N
(k)
i this would lead to node N
(k0)
j , j 6= i,w i t hk0 = k if
i =1a n dk0 = k − 1i fi =2 . S i n c en o d eN
(k0)
j is not reached in equilibrium and since all
57A possible psychological rationale for this is that players tend to prefer structuring analogy classes so that
expectations can be checked on the equilibrium path (without trembling requirement).
32analogy classes must be reached with positive probability, it must be that there is an analogy
class αi of player i such that (j,N
(k0)
j ) ∈ αi and (j,N
(k00)
j ) ∈ αi where k00 <k 0 (nodes N
(k00)
j
with k00 >k 0 are not reached).58 Since at any node N
(k00)
j with k00 <k 0 player j Passes with
probability 1 (remember that Take at node N
(k)
i is the assumed outcome), it must be that
the analogy-based expectation of player i satis￿es




But given this expectation (and given that for all k, 1
2ak−2+ 1
2ak−1 >a k and 1
2bk−2+ 1
2bk−1 >
bk), Taking at node N
(k)
i cannot be a best-response to βi (at node N
(k)
i ,p l a y e ri should strictly
prefer Passing rather than Taking). This leads to a contradiction.
4.3 Multiplicity and Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibrium
In this subsection we would like to highlight the implication of analogy reasoning on the
multiplicity of equilibria. A ￿rst observation is that the analogy treatment may sometimes
kill the multiplicity of equilibria that would otherwise prevail. For example, in the in￿nitely
repeated prisoner￿s dilemma PDδ, we observed that if one player has an analogy partitioning
such that his own actions play no role, then the only equilibrium outcome is the repetition of
(D,D). Here, the analogy treatment kills the multiplicity because it does not permit enough
conditioning of players￿ expectations.
A second observation is that the analogy treatment may sometimes create a multiplicity
of equilibria by permitting some form of conditioning that would not be possible otherwise.
For example, in the ￿nitely repeated prisoner￿s dilemma in which player 1 uses two classes
according to whether or not at least one D was played earlier and player 2 uses the ￿nest
partitioning, we saw an equilibrium in which both players play C except in the last two periods
(see subsection 3.3.). But, there is also an equilibrium for this partitioning in which both
players play D in every period. Here, the multiplicity arises because the analogy treatment
permits a conditioning of player 1￿s expectation (upon whether or not at least one D was
played earlier) that would not be possible otherwise (due to the logic of backward induction).
A third observation is that the consistency condition (1) implies non-linearities, thus
creating a potential for multiple equilibria, even when players use a single class of analogy59
and there is a unique equilibrium in the setup without analogy. For example, in the centipede
game CPK in which both players use the coarsest partition and condition (4) holds, we saw
that there are two pure strategy analogy-based expectation equilibria (see Proposition 3).
58T h e r ee x i s t sa tl e a s to n es u c hn o d eb e c a u s e( i,k) 6=( 1,1).
59Hence, no conditioning of the type just mentioned is at work.
334.4 Related literature
There are very few approaches to analogy in economics. These include the axiomatic ap-
proaches of Rubinstein (1988) and Gilboa-Schmeidler (1994) about similarity and case-based
decision theory, respectively (which derive representation theorems for decision processes sat-
isfying a number of axioms). These also include the automata theory developed for game
theory by Rubinstein (1986), and Abreu-Rubinstein (1988) (see also Samuelson 2000 for a
recent contribution with an explicit reference to the analogy interpretation). In the automa-
ton setup, two diﬀerent histories60 h and h0 may induce the same state of player i￿s machine,
and thus the same action of player i;P l a y e ri then acts in an analogous way in h and h0. It
should be noted that none of the above approaches considers the treatment of expectations
(as opposed to behaviors) by analogy.
I now discuss a few alternative approaches to bounded rationality and how they relate
to (diﬀer from) the analogy-based expectation approach. By bounded rationality, I mean
here that either players fail to optimize their true payoﬀs given their expectations (failure
of instrumental rationality) or players fail to have correct expectations (failure of cognitive
rationality) or players have a wrong perception about the game being played. Clearly, the
analogy-based expectation equilibrium approach challenges the cognitive rationality, but not
the other two features of rationality.
In his discussion of small words, Savage (1954) suggests the possibility that a decision
maker may not be able to envision the whole complexity of the state space when making a
decision.61 In the analogy-based expectation approach too, players form expectations about
the behavior of others by simplifying the node space over which other players must move.
One can view the present paper as an attempt to incorporate Savage￿s small word idea into
a game theoretic context.62
Simon (see, for example, Simon 1955) is clearly one of the leaders in emphasizing the
need to incorporate bounded rationality into economics. One of his main concerns is that the
process of decision making be manageable in particular with respect to information gathering.
The analogy treatment proposed in this paper shares with this view the worry to ensure that
learning is more manageable (as a result of a simpli￿cation of what players are supposed to
60Or two diﬀerent games G and G
0 in Samuelson￿s setup.
61In a one-agent problem this may be viewed as either challenging the cognitive rationality assumption or
as an erroneous perception of the decision problem. See also McLeod (2000) for recent research along this
line.
62A key motivation for my concept is to make learning feasible (by simplifying the predictions on which
learning is supposed to bear). Such a motivation is not present in Savage (1955) who develops a more
introspective approach.
34learn). However, Simon (1955) emphasizes other elements of simpli￿cation in the decision
making like the use of simpli￿ed payoﬀ functions (in the form of satis￿cing).63
More recent approaches include the ε-equilibrium of Radner (1986) and the quantal re-
sponse equilibrium of McKelvey-Palfrey (1992-1995) (see also Chen-Friedman-Thisse 1997).
These approaches assume that players fail to optimize exactly (either they optimize up to
ε in Radner or they play any strategy with positive probability in McKelvey-Palfrey), but
expectations about what other players might do are assumed to be accurate (in every con-
tingency). Thus these approaches challenge the cognitive rationality, but not the other forms
of rationality.64
Studies of limited foresight in multi-stage games (see Jehiel 1995-1998-2001) also challenge
the cognitive rationality assumption in that players are assumed to form predictions only
about a truncated future. However, the form of limitation imposed by limited foresight is
substantially diﬀerent from that imposed by analogy reasoning.65
In the context of normal form games, Osborne-Rubinstein (1998) model situations in
which players behave as if they were not in a strategic environment. Players experiment
each possible action once (or several times), and choose the action that delivered the highest
payoﬀ. This approach (at least with this interpretation) as well as that of Greenberg (1996)
challenges the view that players have a correct perception of the game being played (see also
Camerer 1998 for an experimental account of misperceptions of games).
Finally, other approaches to the ￿nite horizon paradoxes include the crazy type approach
(Kreps et al. 1982), the ε-equilibrium (Radner), the quantal response equilibrium (McKelvey-
Palfrey), the lack of common knowledge of the termination date (Neyman 1986), the justi-
￿ability approach (Spiegler 2000).66 The ε-equilibrium and quantal response equilibrium
approaches were already discussed. None of the other approaches rely on a form of bounded
rationality as de￿ned above.
63Also, Simon does not emphasize the implications of his approach in strategic environments with several
decision makers interacting at the same time.
64See also Tesfatsion (1984) for another example of this sort.
65For example, limited foresight alone is incapable of explaining that players may Pass in the centipede
game. In the precursor of this paper (Jehiel 1999), I combined limited foresight and the analogy idea to
analyze the centipede game.
66In the ￿nitely repeated prisoners￿ dilemma, Benoit develops a non-equibrium approach in which expecta-
tions about the other player￿s strategy may be arbitrary. Since no constraint of any sort is placed on these
expectations, his approach seems hard to generalize.
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